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On March 11, 2011 Japan moved eight feet closer to North America, the earth’s axis 
shifted by nearly ten inches, and the world turned upside down for 128 million Japanese.  Each 
of us watched in horror as 20,000 people were washed away by a tsunami just minutes after a 
9.0 magnitude earthquake shifted the sea floor off the Tohoku coast.  And then, in slower 
motion, we witnessed the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor, the displacement 
of 110,000 residents, and the spread of an invisible radioactive terror (real even if only 
imagined) across the archipelago.  This quake, tsunami, and meltdown — a triple catastrophe 
with no precedent—formally the Great Eastern Japan Disaster (Higashi Nihon Daishinsai), soon 
became known simply as “3.11.’’ 
 
Change 
The weeks and months after 3.11 were filled with calls for (or anticipation of) wholesale 
change across a very broad institutional horizon.  Google searches in Japanese more than nine 
months after 3.11 that paired “Rebirth” (saisei) with “Great Eastern Japan Disaster” (higashi 
nippon daishinsai) generated nearly 27 million hits.  Substituting “Change” (kaikaku) for “Rebirth” 
yielded ten times more (261 million) hits, suggesting that a deep yearning for (or at least a 
heightened expectation of) change undergirded the national conversation.   And indeed, there 
emerged a widespread optimism on both the left and the right that a stagnant nation was in the 
midst of a sort of Schumpeterian moment of “creative destruction.”    
Japan would “put it in gear,” and 3.11 would be the trigger for a long sought national 
recovery.  On the right, a retired defense official said there would be a reawakening of Japanese 
hearts after a period of excessive materialism, and predicted that “the 3.11 disaster will be seen 
as a big shock that led a declining Japan to revival.”1  Conservative Tokyo Governor Ishihara 
Shintarō went him one better, arguing that 3.11 was an opportunity to “wash away the greed” 
that had become central to Japanese national identity.2  On the left, a group of activist scientists 
and engineers insisted that 3.11 marked “the beginning of a new chapter in Japanese history,” 
one that would be more transparent and that would put an end to the “spell of deceit” 
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engineered by elites in Tokyo.3  Abe Tomoko, the policy committee chair of the Democratic 
Socialist Party, insisted that “all of Japan, not just Tohoku—needs a recovery.”4 In the center, a 
former prime minister spoke of 3.11 as an opportunity for Tohoku to become the model for 21st 
Century Japan, insisting that “unless we resolve to reset and be reborn, we will never recover”; 
a senior member of the Cabinet’s Reconstruction Design Council (Fukkō Kaigi) spoke of the 
“geriatric diseases” afflicting Japanese institutions and expressed hope that 3.11 would 
“generate a new nation.”5  Some of the discourse was not so much hopeful as openly 
hyperbolic—as in the statement by one veteran political journalist who insisted that 3.11 
“changed everything” by creating “a new political paradigm.”6  Professor Wada Akira of the 
Tokyo Institute of Technology saw 3.11 as “an opportunity to change our thinking, our 
civilization.”7  Even the otherwise analytical Mikuriya Takashi, vice chair of the Reconstruction 
Design Council, proclaimed in the first sentence of his memoir that “3.11 will change Japan and 
the world.”8   
After observers and political entrepreneurs had caught their breath, however, it was 
clear that change was not first on everyone’s agenda.  A range of discourse—from “accelerating” 
to “sustaining” to “returning” to better days past—was actively in play.  In addition to those 
calling upon Japan to “put it in gear,” there were others who insisted Japan should “stay the 
course.” In the energy sector, for example, stakeholders insisted that “if we change too fast, the 
situation will become more chaotic.  We need to be prudent.”9  Japan must not write off the 
enormous sunk costs of its nuclear power program, for doing so would increase energy costs, 
destroy jobs, slow growth, result in power shortages, pollute the environment, and result in 
higher taxes.  Japan would be worse off than before.10   In the area of national security policy, 
the performance of the Japanese military and of the U.S. Japan alliance demonstrated that the 
institutions proved their value and should be reinforced and enhanced, but not transformed.11 
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There were also influential voices arguing for a return to better times in the past.   
Perhaps the most distinguished advocate of this (decidedly minority) position was Kyoto 
University philosopher (and Tohoku born) Umehara Takeshi.  Umehara, who served as a special 
advisor to the Reconstruction Design Council, is widely known as a proponent of Japanese 
essentialism— the much maligned nihonjinron.12  Umehara considered 3.11 a “cultural disaster” 
(bunmeisai) and insisted that Japan must “return to coexistence with nature” (kyōzon ni 
kaerō).13  In his view, the quake and tsunami were natural disasters, but the nuclear meltdown 
signaled the limits of enlightenment thinking—the mistaken belief that humans can control 
nature.  In a widely read New Year’s Day debate with the chairman of Keidanren, Umehara 
insisted that it is arrogant (omoi agari) to imagine that humans can harness the power of the 
atom, adding: “Compared to the western view that humans can conquer nature, we Japanese 
believe that all animals and plants and minerals are Buddhas.” Now is the time, he asserted, for 
Japanese to abandon their lives of “excessive consumption” and waste, and build a new 
civilization based on “spirituality consistent with Japanese tradition and to give thanks for the 
blessings of nature.”14   
Change, or resistance to it, was the principal motif of 3.11.  It was more contested and 
was applied more widely than any other.  But it was only one of four elements that came to 
dominate the post-disaster discourse.  Change was joined in a crowded and confused rhetorical 
landscape by Leadership, Risk, and Community.  We examine each of these other tropes—and 
their villains and heroes—in turn. 
 
Leadership       
 It is difficult to find many observers who were satisfied with the quality of Japanese 
leadership after 3.11.  Japan’s leadership deficit—long recognized as a serious shortcoming—
was widely viewed as the single greatest impediment to an effective response to 3.11, let alone 
some sort of transformation of Japan.15  In early April, an Asahi Shimbun editorial writer, Soga 
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Takeshi, declared that “our political leaders have yet to offer a single convincing statement 
about the disaster that strikes an emotional chord in the hearts of the people.”  Instead, he said, 
politicians and bureaucrats fight among themselves, while “our nation is waiting to hear the 
voice of a great orator.”16  This view was widely embraced in the Japanese media across the 
ideological spectrum.  Jiji Press, for example, opined in late March that the prime minister “has 
not given sufficient explanation to dispel the people’s fears nor has he displayed leadership.”17  
Three days earlier, the Yomiuri Shimbun insisted that “the prime minister is not showing vital 
leadership,” and a few days later the Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported that “criticism is mounting” 
over Kan’s “unseen face.”18  There was a widespread yearning for a contemporary Gotō Shinpei, 
the visionary mayor of Tokyo who moved vigorously to rebuild the capital after the Great Kanto 
Earthquake in 1923.19 
Plenty of shots (cheap and otherwise) were fired at Prime Minister Kan by opponents 
both within and outside the DPJ.20  But the larger problems of leadership were expressed with 
particular gravity by those who most depended upon it.  A great many local public officials 
declared the government to be “insensitive” to the victims.  Mayor Toba Futoshi of 
Rikuzentakada, for example, threw up his hands in frustration, declaring that nothing changes 
for the people on the periphery.  Local victims, he said, are treated as distant objects by 
politicians, none of whom made sufficient efforts to assess their needs or to appreciate how 
those needs evolve.21  His colleague Fukushima Kenji, mayor of Rokkashō mura in nearby 
Aomori prefecture, asked incredulously “does the premier know the hardship that we at the site 
are going through?”22 It was the localities’ frustration with ineffective responses from the 
central authorities that led to their exercise of local autonomy and translocal solidarity, one of 
the most immediate—and likely consequential—policy innovations after 3.11. 
   As problems of leadership moved front and center, a motif of leadership villainy evolved 
in which the center-left government of Kan Naoto became the lead rogue.    On this account, 
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the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was a group of “amateurs” who were insufficiently 
aggressive in implementing the changes they had promised in their 2009 Party manifesto and 
too slow to respond to the crisis itself.23  Prime Minister Kan, who went to Fukushima the day 
after the quake and tsunami, was roundly criticized for trying to micro-manage rescue and relief 
operations, thereby delaying an effective response.24  He had no command authority, in part 
because he had neutered the bureaucracy upon which crisis management had to depend.25  As 
a result, it was said, “the government’s move was always one step behind … caus[ing] the 
damage to spread.”26     
A tale of grossly incompetent leadership was being spun, and the same villain was in 
everyone’s crosshairs.  In what took on the characteristics of an echo chamber, Kan—and the 
public—began hearing the same criticisms from every corner.  According to some, Kan was an 
anti-professional who governed the nation as if it were a citizen’s movement; to others, like 
former Prime Minister Nakasone and Keidanren Chairman Yonekura, Kan lacked crisis 
management skills.27  Even Abe Shinzō, whose own premiership had crashed and burned just 
four years earlier, wrote an article entitled “If it Were Me, This is What I’d Do,” in which he 
declared that Kan was an emperor with no clothes.28  A deputy news editor of the Yomiuri 
Shimbun asked rhetorically: “Is Kan going to be the worst premier in history?”29 A weekly 
magazine spoke of “Kan’s meltdown” and “slapstick theater” at the prime minister’s office.30  
Even the judicious public servant Ogata Sadako, who was director general of the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency during 3.11, has said that the prime minister “did not 
understand what he was doing.  The people were good, but their leaders were poor.  It was 
clear that the most responsible people were simply not capable.”31 
The critiques of government were inconsistent:  too much consultation versus too little, 
too much on site presence versus too much distance, too much elite direction versus too little, 
too much political control of the bureaucrats versus too little, too much “presidentialism” 
versus too little, too much micro-management versus too much detachment, too much speed 
versus too much lethargy, too many snap decisions versus too much caution.  But they were 
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relentless, and the Japanese public accepted them.  Although the prime minister’s support 
seemed to increase when he acted presidentially, he did so too rarely and saw his public 
approval ebb away.32  Poll results varied, but it soon became clear that the criticisms were eating 
away at what remained of Kan’s popularity.  Although he enjoyed some support in general 
terms a month after the disaster, the public came to be overwhelmingly dissatisfied with his 
handling of the nuclear disaster.  Nearly three quarters of respondents in one poll found the 
disclosure of information regarding the nuclear crisis to be “unsatisfactory,” and fully 70% said 
they did not support the prime minister because “he has no leadership capability.”33   Within a 
month, more than three quarters of the public reported that Kan was “not exercising 
leadership.”34  Leadership, the holy grail of Japanese governance and the equal of any post-3.11 
national concern, requires trust.  For Kan, trust became a rapidly wasting asset.  But there was 
another theme competing for space in the public imagination, one centered on vulnerability 
and risk that identified an even more imposing villain-- TEPCO.    
 
Risk  
The risk motif was officially introduced by the Reconstruction Design Council at the 
beginning of its June 2011 report:   “The disaster revealed in one fell swoop the inherent 
vulnerability of modern civilization.”35  Vulnerability, a hoary trope in Japanese discourse, is 
often captured in the “small island nation” (shimaguniron) explanation for contemporary life 
that many Japanese invoke to remind themselves that they are an endangered people in a 
fragile land.36  So it is no surprise that this fragility became a leading element of national 
discourse after 3.11.  As one senior Defense Ministry official explained with reference to the 
themes of change and leadership introduced above: “The quake highlighted the country risk of 
Japan.  Without leadership and a better political system, Japan will not be good at managing 
crises—and there is more danger ahead.”37  Anticipation of future danger was everywhere after 
3.11.  On the four month anniversary of the disaster, Japan’s leading booksellers displayed titles 
such as: The Meltdown of Japan; Japan’s Third Defeat; What Will Happen to the Japanese 
Economy after the Disaster?; Japan’s Nuclear Crisis Zone; and A Manual to Deal with Nuclear 
Power Accidents.  And on the six month anniversary, the pairing of the terms “fuan” (insecurity 
                                                     
32
 The Economist, 24 May 2011. 
33
 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 18 April 2011. 
34
 Kyodo, 1 May 2011.  U.S. government officials, for their part, credit Kan with effective leadership.  One asked 
rhetorically: “Who knows what would have happened if Kan hadn’t screamed at TEPCO?”  Interview, Tokyo, 7 
October 2011. 
35
 Higashi Nihon Daishinsai Fukkō Kōsō Kaigi, ed., 2011, p.2. 
36
 Dinmore, 2006. 
37
 Interview, Takamizaka Nobushige, Ministry of Defense Policy Bureau Chief, Tokyo, 7 July 2011. 
Re-Draft for the Journal of Japanese Studies  7-19-12 
7 
 
or anxiety) and “3.11” in a Japanese Google search surfaced 131 million hits, while “anzen” 
(safety) and “3.11” yielded 524 million.  
 There are a great many ways to express concerns about risk and vulnerability in 
Japanese, including a term borrowed from the English: risuku.  But the one that came to 
dominate the post 3-11 national discourse along with change, leadership, and community was 
the slightly more oblique—and, as it turned out, the far more incendiary—term “unimaginable” 
(sōteigai).  Sōteigai cannot be translated directly as either risk or vulnerability, but perhaps 
because the greatest threats to a people are the ones that are unanticipated, its use by 
government and TEPCO as an explanation for their failure to prepare for a 3.11 scale disaster 
evoked both, and soon dominated the national discourse.     
 Sōteigai was used both by those who advocated putting Japan in gear and by those who 
insisted that Japan should stay the course.  For the latter, it was often used as a “masking” 
argument, a common rhetorical device that shifts responsibility for a performance failure.38  
TEPCO vice president Fujimoto Takashi, for example, insisted that it was not TEPCO’s failure to 
anticipate such a calamitous natural event, but the nation’s: “To what extent can we burden 
ratepayers to prepare for disasters that occur only every several hundred years and that 
considerably exceed in scale what the nation has foreseen?”39  He was joined by a TEPCO 
general manager who insisted that “the accident at Fukushima Daiichi was caused by a tsunami 
far beyond the design basis.”  It was, he says, an “unforeseeable accident.”40  Former TEPCO Vice 
President and influential member of the House of Councilors Kanō Tokio rejected the idea that 
the nuclear power industry might have been too complaisant about risk and further widened 
the circle of responsibility for 3.11:   
“It is a shame, but it was not only TEPCO and the nuclear power industry that 
found it convenient not to imagine these possibilities. [The failure to foresee] 
emerged from a democratic debate and from government established safety 
standards.  It was on these standards that nuclear power plants were built and 
operated.”41  
These stakeholders were joined by an occasionally sympathetic media.  The Yomiuri Shimbun, 
for example, reminded readers that the Jōgan earthquake, the last temblor and tsunami on this 
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scale, occurred in the year 869 and asked a familiar question: “How do we prepare for 
something that happens once in 1,000 years?”42   
  For those who deployed sōteigai as a call to action, discussion of “unimaginable” and 
“unanticipated” events was merely a useful foil against which to argue for better preparation, 
larger budgets, better government, and stronger leadership—that is, improvements across the 
board.43  But few experts accepted TEPCO’s sōteigai defense.  To the contrary, many protested 
what they considered the misappropriation of the term by the nuclear power industry and its 
allies in business and government.  Even the head of the Nuclear Safety Commission testified 
before a special Diet panel and excoriated his own staff and utility officials for their insouciance 
vis-à-vis safety.  He suggested that they ignored international guidelines, instead “spending their 
time finding excuses” for not taking adequate safety measures.44  Professor Nakabayashi Itsuki 
of Meiji University distinguished different kinds of accidental events—those that are fully within 
human imagination and that can be mitigated by prior planning (sōteinai), and those that are 
imaginable but which cannot be fully mitigated ahead of time (sōtei ijō).  For truly unimaginable 
events he considers “resilience” the only response available, and he suggests that 3.11 was not 
in this category.45  Clearly, the invocation of the sōteigai defense failed to protect its 
promulgators and served instead to embolden their critics.    
  There was certainly no shortage of critics.  If Kan became the whipping boy in the 
discourse on leadership, TEPCO became the consensus villain in the one on risk and vulnerability.  
It was an easy target.46  TEPCO has a long history of falsifying safety reports and covering up 
violations, and in this instance its managers reportedly withheld information from the public 
and hesitated to cool the crippled Fukushima Daiichi reactors with seawater in order to avoid 
compromising its capital investment.47  TEPCO’s alleged deceits were captured most luridly in a 
nine story compendium in an early April issue of a major Japanese weekly with the headline: 
“TEPCO’s Crimes and Punishment.”48  The August 2011 issue of Sekai, a leading progressive 
monthly, contained an article titled “TEPCO as a Social Problem.”  Prime Minister Kan was 
among the first to demonize TEPCO, demanding its executives tell him “what the hell is going on” 
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in the first days after the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors.49  Arguing that “people 
would be arrested if gas tanks explode or if a fire breaks out in a department store,” Saitama 
Governor Ueda Kiyosha insisted that TEPCO officials should be held criminally responsible for 
the nuclear crisis.50     
The demonizing critique had even sharper teeth when it came from Fukushima itself.  
Sakurai Katsunobu, the mayor of Minami Soma who lost more than 650 of his neighbors and 
who became internationally known for his plea for assistance on YouTube, called out TEPCO as 
the chief villain of 3.11.51  He insisted that the utility reverted to old patterns of lying and 
falsifying data in its interactions with victims.   Residents who were forced from their homes 
near the crippled reactors left their evacuation centers and came to Tokyo to protest in front of 
TEPCO’s corporate offices and demand compensation.52  Even before the end of March, just 20 
days after the accident, TEPCO actually submitted plans to add two more reactors to the 
Fukushima Daiichi complex—an act of hubris that was not lost on the general public.53  The 
public finally learned in late May—more than two months after the disaster-- that TEPCO had 
known that three of its four reactors had melted down within days of the tsunami.   
TEPCO was the arch villain on this account, but government regulators—many of whom 
were in line to enjoy a post-retirement sinecure in the electric power industry—were cast in the 
roles of abettors and attendants.  On this account, members of a collusive “nuclear village” 
overestimated safety and underestimated risk because the regulators and the regulated had 
been in a conspiratorial embrace for decades.  The press was full of stories about METI 
regulators who allowed TEPCO to draft their regulations and, more salaciously, of officials 
demanding compensation in the form of entertainment.54 The two are often joined at the hip in 
accounts of 3.11 that routinely touch on “slipshod” regulation and cover ups and record 
tampering after previous accidents.55  Former Fukushima Governor Satō Eisaku, for example, 
decried TEPCO’s and METI’s “malign concealment” of past mishaps.  A wounded veteran of 
Japan’s nuclear power politics, Satō referred to METI as the “root of all evil” and concluded that 
3.11 was a “manmade crime of omission by the government and TEPCO”—a “betrayal” of the 
people of Fukushima.56  The public concurred.  In May 2011, nearly three quarters of those 
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surveyed by the Asahi Shimbun said that they “cannot trust TEPCO” for information about the 
nuclear crisis.57 
Sōteigai was used to construct heroes as well as villains.  On the three month 
anniversary of 3.11, for example, the Mainichi Shimbun issued a collection of 300 photos to 
celebrate the rescue and relief services performed by the SDF.  An opening two page spread 
shows the drowned wreckage of a doomed coastal town, its land flooded and its fuel depot 
afire.  Above the photo is the headline: “There is No Word for ‘Unimaginable’” and below the 
photo is an explanation:  
“The SDF has no word for ‘unimaginable.’  It is an organization that must 
immediately confront any nation or entity that attacks Japan’s sovereignty.  There 
is no ‘unimaginable’ condition.   At 2:46pm on March 11, 2011, at the very 
moment of the disaster, the Northeast army, very near the epicenter, set up a 
command headquarters…From that moment, the SDF began its battle to protect 
the lives and properties of the people in response to every kind of condition.”58 
The more conservative Yomiuri Shimbun reinforced this message by pointing out that when 
there is a crisis, the nation does not hesitate to mobilize the SDF, adding that “when the 




If the national sense of failed leadership and the overwhelming (and understandable) 
sense of vulnerability generated more villains than heroes in post-3.11 Japan, the crisis also 
generated a lively discourse about community.  Social solidarity is hardly a new tile in the 
mosaic of Japanese national identity, but social solidarity is always tested in a crisis, and if it 
passes, it is always reinforced.  3.11 was no different.  The people of Tohoku were repeatedly 
(and by all accounts deservedly) applauded for their selflessness and resolve.  They were widely 
admired—almost to the point of essentialist caricature—for their patient and persevering 
nature (gaman zuyoi) and for their acceptance of what had befallen them.  Japan and the world 
were told that the people of Tohoku suffered, but they suffered together.  It would be from that 
social fabric that they would rebuild their communities (machizukuri) and their region 
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(kōikizukuri), and in so doing, that they would lead the way in the rebuilding of the nation 
(kunizukuri).  An article in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun connects two motifs: change and 
community.  Under the headline “Toward a New Japan: The Recovery is Nation Building,” the 
editors devoted a half page to analysis of how community building in Tohoku would lead to “”an 
entire national regeneration…”60  
On this account, the people of Tohoku embodied what it meant to be Japanese—they 
formed a community (komyunitei), connected (tsunagu) by bonds (kizuna) and human contact 
(fureai) that sustain solidarity (renkei) through common struggle (ganbarō nippon!).  Each of 
these terms was familiar—some stirringly so—and each enjoyed a renaissance  after 3.11.  
Virtually overnight, the exhortation to persevere together embodied in “ganbarō nippon!” could 
be found on posters, social media, advertisements, bumper stickers, and hand written missives 
of every kind.  A Japanese language Google search for the expression yielded 18 million hits in 
March 2012, a number that surely understates its ubiquity.61   Paired Japanese language Google 
searches for “connection” and “Great Eastern Japan Disaster” surfaced nearly four million hits in 
December 2011.  Substituting “bonds” for “connection” generated more than three times that 
many, and the borrowed term komyunitei paired with the disaster generated nearly 42 million 
hits.  Nor was social solidarity limited to the people of Tohoku.  The entire nation applauded 
itself for the outpouring of material and human support for displaced and distraught neighbors 
to the northeast.   
Still, one of the most intractable problems for post 3.11 reconstruction—and for the 
appeal to community—was the shallowness of local identities.  Many of the region’s 
municipalities were of recent vintage, created during a wave of administrative consolidation in 
the early 2000s when more than 3200 municipalities were reduced to just over 1700 
nationwide.62  The city of Ishinomaki, for example, was created out of seven towns and villages 
in 2005.  Minami Sōma was created in 2006 through the amalgamation of three separate towns.  
The idea was to rationalize the provision of public services, but some of these new cities were 
so sprawling—Minami Sōma, 20km from north to south, is a good example—that some 
residents found themselves cut off from first responders on 3.11.63  The consolidation seems to 
have weakened the capacity of localities to respond to citizens at just the moment when they 
were in greatest need.  Just as important, few residents felt allegiance to the newly constructed 
localities.  Instead, they were connected to their original villages and counties, communities 
that were difficult to reconstruct in temporary shelters.   Reports of distrust among the new 
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neighbors were reflected in choices of temporary shelters and undercut the ideals of 
community that were being spun by political leaders and editorialists.64   
Just as the Reconstruction Design Council officially validated the vulnerability and risk 
motif, so it sanctified community as a key element for post-disaster Japan.   The word kizuna 
appears a dozen times—and in every chapter—in the Council’s short report.  The companion 
term tsunagu (connection) appears 36 times, usually in brackets for emphasis.  In addition, the 
report uses the borrowed word komyunitei 35 times.  In all, there are 83 references to social 
solidarity in just 39 pages.65   The report was the handiwork of vice-chair Mikuriya Takashi, who 
invoked poetry in his appeal to fellow Council members:  
“People connect to people, regions connect to regions, firms connect to firms, 
and municipalities connect to prefectures and to the central government.  
Regional communities connect within and without, eastern Japan connects to 
Western Japan, and nations connect to one another.  Whether they are big or 
small, we have discovered that connections (tsunagu) are the means by which 
support becomes reality and the means by which light will shine on recovery.”66  
 The first of seven fundamental principles articulated in the Basic Law for Recovery from 
the Great Eastern Japan Disaster was that the recovery should honor the loss of lives and learn 
lessons from 3.11.  Three others focused on community and social solidarity:  the second 
principle called for “restoration of the essence of regional community”, the fourth addressed 
the need “to continue protecting the strong bonds of regional society”, and the seventh 
identified “citizens’ solidarity” as a requisite for recovery.67  Likewise, each of the affected 
prefectures emphasized community building in official post disaster planning documents. The 
first of eight points in the ten year Miyagi recovery plan called for “promotion of community 
building.” The Iwate plan was based on nine special zones, the sixth among which called for 
“community building” to replace the more than 47% of capital stock lost in the tsunami.  
Fukushima’s “recovery vision” was the product of the region’s most exhausted and paralyzed 
prefecture.  It seemed to contain more bromides than hope, but called prominently for “the 
rebirth of solidarity.”68   
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  No doubt because it evokes practical next steps, the term “community building” 
(machizukuri) was invoked by government officials and planners more than any other reference 
to the post-disaster collectivity.  But the metaphorically richer term kizuna was also prominent 
in the broader post-3.11 discourse.   Kizuna was already a familiar, and therefore easily 
embraced, social referent.  Used in the title of songs, anime, manga, and video games, kizuna 
was ubiquitous in Japanese popular culture well before 3.11.  It was even the nickname given to 
the high speed internet communications satellite launched by the government in 2008.    
Kizuna was formally consecrated as the representation of post-disaster solidarity twice.  
The first instance was official: one month after 3.11, Prime Minister Kan issued a statement 
entitled “Kizuna- The Bonds of Friendship,” thanking the world for its generosity and its 
outpouring of concern for the people of Tohoku.69  The Japanese people may be forgiven for 
missing this English language missive to the international community, but kizuna became the 
most prominent representation of post-disaster community when it was celebrated in an annual 
ceremony at the Kiyomizu Temple in Kyoto in December 2011.  In the autumn and early winter 
each year, during the run up to the New Year holiday, the priests there invite the Japanese 
public to submit their choice of the single Chinese character that best captures the mood of the 
previous year.  While sometimes celebratory (“love” in 2005 and “life” in 2006), the zeitgeist is 
represented more often by expressions of concern and anxiety: “war” in 2001, “return” (of 
kidnapped youth) in 2002.  The character had been inspired by disasters twice before: “quake” 
(shin) in 1995 after the Hanshin/Awaji earthquake, and “disaster” (sai) after the Chūetsu quake 
in 2004.  This time, after sorting through more than 60,000 entries, chief priest Mori Seihan 
wielded a long brush dabbed in black ink and inscribed the more positive and celebratory 
kizuna before a national audience.70   
 Kizuna was appropriated broadly as a metaphor for social solidarity.  The Japan Graphic 
Design Association created a striking web-based “Kizuna Japan Project” that captured the 
cultural, spiritual, and ethical climate of a nation determined to connect to itself and its future.  
In a bit more than six minutes, more than five dozen separate graphic images flow one into 
another, evoking a national family that is reconnecting and recovering.  The rising sun is 
represented variously as a knot of red silk, as a heart, as backdrop for the character kizuna, and 
in multiple messages of solidarity with the people of Tohoku.  The disaster victims are reminded 
they are “never alone.” They are exhorted to “take each others’ hands” and to “connect 
everyone’s thoughts and feelings.”71      
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Politicians and private firms were not far behind in the appropriation of newly fortified 
metaphors for national solidarity.  In January 2012 nine dissident DPJ Diet members, all allies of 
Ozawa Ichirō, left the party to form the “New Party Kizuna.”72  The irony, of course, was that in 
doing so they slashed their “bonds” with the DPJ.  The Rengo trade union federation 
campaigned for members yearning for community.  Union membership, according to one 
subway poster, would “build a society (shakaizukuri) with hope and peace of mind” and 
promised to “connect Japan.”73  Meanwhile, a sake brewer issued a new brand labeled “Tohoku 
no Kizuna” (The Bonds of Tohoku), promising that 2% of the proceeds from sales would support 
disaster victims.74     
Heroes are much easier to find in this corner of the national discourse, as they come 
directly from the affected communities.  They were the municipal mayors, like Minami Soma’s 
Sakurai Katsunobu, who stood by his post and issued a quickly famous “YouTube SOS” on behalf 
of 8,000 displaced residents in 40 shelters within city limits, and Rikuzentakata’s Mayor Toba 
Futoshi, who continued to supervise rescue and relief efforts even after his wife and 68 
employees were swept into the sea.  They included rank and file local officials like the twenty-
two police officers who died while on duty, or emergency workers like Endō Miki, the 24 year 
old woman who broadcast repeated tsunami warnings until she was herself washed away from 
her post in Minami Sanriku’s crisis management center.  Ms. Endo is credited with saving 700 
lives, and is memorialized on dozens of YouTube videos and on hundreds of blogs.  Her 
“determination to fulfill a public duty in the midst of a crisis” was recognized by Prime Minister 
Noda Yoshihiko in his first Diet speech in September 2011.  She also was celebrated by 
Kobayashi Yoshinori, the right wing cartoonist.75   
Others were more ambiguously heroic, however.  The first to come to the attention of 
the global media were plant workers who, ignoring their personal safety, returned to the reactor 
site in an effort to contain the damage.  Dubbed the “Fukushima Fifty” by the foreign media, 
these workers’ story was too enticing for some hagiographers to ignore.  A headline in the Asahi 
Shimbun declared that “The Struggles of the Fukushima Fifty Will Not End,” and the newspaper 
reported that “bearing the burdens and uncertainty, they continue to battle an unseen 
enemy.”76  There were two problems with these accounts.  First, there were far more than fifty 
workers—TEPCO said that the actual number of workers who returned to the plant was closer 
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to 700.  Only small numbers could enter at one time, and only for brief periods, so they rotated 
through quickly.  More problematic, many of these workers may not have been the “samurai 
salarymen” of legend or even “volunteers” at all, but low paid and exploited contract workers 
who had no other employment options.  One analyst asks provocatively if these men were “a 
committed TEPCO vanguard, or the castoffs of Japan’s employment system who are being 
brought in for a highly paid suicide mission?”77  Indeed, in its 2010 annual report, TEPCO 
disclosed that fewer than 20% of the employees at Fukushima Daiichi were regular TEPCO staff 
and reports that fully 100% of severe injuries to plant workers were incurred by contractors in 
2009, up from 89% in 2008.78 A conservative vice governor of Tokyo ignores all that, focusing his 
account instead on how welcome it is that plant workers shattered the postwar taboo against 
living or dying for others.79  
 
How the Discourse Divided 
 Like all catastrophes, 3.11 generated pain and imagination, heroes and villains.  Political 
entrepreneurs with motivation and resources were quick to do battle for control of the event.  
They spun narrative explanations for the tragedy across a broad horizon of meanings and values, 
all conforming to their own preexisting preferences and to what they believed would be 
effective with the Japanese public.  Existing enemies were enemies still, but newly villainous.  
The stakeholders, thus rearmed, then used these narratives aggressively in an effort to shift the 
still unformed preferences of a general public struggling to make sense of otherwise 
unfathomable events. 
In a larger study I examine the use of these narratives in three policy areas: security, 
energy, and local public administration.80  In each case, extant and aspiring political actors spun 
up stories to help make sense of the disaster, always in ways consistent with what they already 
knew to be true. Hence their stories were consistent with “normal” politics. Those who thought 
the utilities were villains before 3.11 insisted that 3.11 proved their point. Those who believed 
the DPJ was a collection of incompetent parvenus before 3.11, likewise now had additional 
evidence to make their case.  Supporters of the Japan-U.S. alliance and of the Japanese military 
renewed their claim that they were right all along—Japan and the world now had “proof of 
concept” after 3.11. There was a continued, albeit intensified, competition among political 
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actors armed with a new tool—the disaster itself.  As Karl Von Clausewitz might have framed it, 
3.11 was simply the continuation of “normal” politics by additional means.81  
This new tool, 3.11, was used differently in each of these three sectors. Some policy 
entrepreneurs insisted that the catastrophe was a warning that Japan must abandon past 
practice and head in a new direction. In the security realm this was based on a reading of 3.11 
as a “wake up call.”  The natural disaster was a test run of military preparedness, but the real 
threat would be much more challenging. In a war, troops and commanders would not be using 
cell phones to coordinate responses and would not focus on rescuing civilians. They would be 
under fire and struggling to survive themselves. Japan therefore needed to “put it in gear,” and 
use this historic chance to prepare to confront its real enemies— on some accounts even to 
move beyond the alliance with the United States. The SDF were heroes, of course, and, even 
though they could not be blamed for the catastrophe, the real villains were China, Russia, and 
North Korea.  
In the case of energy policy, this “forward leaning” response would require 
transformation of the entire electric power sector. The lesson of the disaster was that nuclear 
power—until 3.11 the foundation of Japan’s “Basic Energy Plan” and a key element of its “New 
Growth Strategy”—would have to be shut down and replaced by renewable energy. If a second 
economic renaissance were to occur, the regional monopolies, with their centralized power 
generation and one way transmission that had powered Japan’s postwar economic miracle, 
would have to be replaced by distributed power sources and smart grids that both generate and 
consume power. The entire regulatory structure would have to be torn down and replaced with 
one that avoided capture by the firms and their allies in government.  Since the villains in this 
narrative —TEPCO, METI, LDP, and Keidanren—were evil on the face of it, their collusive 
“nuclear village” would have to be dismantled root and branch. 
 In the case of local government, policy entrepreneurs identified two ways forward 
after 3.11, each portending a significant redimensioning of the scope and scale of public 
administration. Japan could “supersize” or it could “localize.” Advocates of the former, such as 
Keidanren, saw in 3.11 an opportunity to revive the repeatedly debated—but always deferred—
plan to eliminate prefectures and replace them with larger states. They pressed a view that the 
disaster proved that when districts are too small, authority is fractured, hindering the effective 
delivery of public services. Creating special, comprehensive economic zones with relaxed central 
regulation would be the first step toward scaling up to a state system (dōshūsei) that would 
rationalize services and generate public goods, including free trade. Miyagi Governor Murai 
Yoshihiro was eager to “supersize” primary industry in Miyagi and was a leading advocate of 
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these special zones. The larger state system concept was embraced by Osaka Mayor Hashimoto 
Tōru, undoubtedly the most revolutionary politician to burst on the national scene after 3.11. 
The localizers, however, saw big firms and bigger states as the problem, if not as outright villains. 
The scale of local government was already too grand. They argued that had the government not 
forced the amalgamation of localities before 3.11, a great many more victims could have been 
rescued. In their view, moreover, small scale had economic benefits as well. It was small 
producers and their privileged position in global niche markets that would rescue the Tohoku 
economy. The faceoff between Iwate Governor Tasso Takuya, who embraced this view, and his 
neighbor, Miyagi Governor Murai, cast the choice between supersizing and localizing in sharp 
relief.      
If this forward leaning model demanded doing things differently and exaggerated 3.11 
failures in order to justify change, the second, “stay the course” model required doing the same 
things better and inflated the virtues of the status quo ante. This was the dominant perspective 
in the national security case, where alliance managers and defense analysts were delighted to 
see the Japanese military and the U.S. alliance accepted by an unprecedented majority of the 
general public. They weaved a sort of “we told you so” narrative, maintaining that their years of 
insistence on the value of the alliance and the quality of the SDF were now proven concepts. 
The lesson of 3.11 was that Japanese military power and the alliance each could be further 
enhanced at just the moment when the need for provision of national security was becoming 
most acute. 
In the energy case, this second narrative model took two forms, both of which urged 
the government to “stay the course” of nuclear power. Each was justified by a “black swan” 
defense in which its proponents insisted that since 3.11 was the consequence of an enormously 
unlikely—indeed, unimaginable (sōteigai)—confluence of events, no one could be held culpable 
for the damage that accompanied the catastrophe. Both groups defending the energy status 
quo had a more difficult task than in the security area, since they were forced to defend 
villainous businesses, not heroic militaries. The first cohort adopted a more defensive “business 
as usual” posture: any changes to the extant electric power sector—especially to the provision 
of nuclear power—would be unwise, or as one DPJ elder put it, “suicidal.”82 Changes to the 
electric power sector could have perverse consequences, e.g., electric power supplies would 
decline, prices would rise, economic growth would stall, and both unemployment and pollution 
would rise; they could jeopardize operation of the most stable supply system in the industrial 
world and counter trends toward liberalization; or else they could waste resources and time—in 
essence, they could be futile.83 “Business as usual” was therefore the best available option. The 
second group that urged staying the course of nuclear power comprised self-declared “realists” 
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who acknowledged that nuclear power may have been more risky than the industry and its 
regulators had been willing to acknowledge, and that this would and should change as Japan 
returned to its only rational course—the restarting of its reactors. This group reminded the 
Japanese public that zero risk is impossible, and urged planners to improve their designs and 
enhance transparency—the only ways to ensure risk is reduced to acceptable levels.  
This second model was most dynamic and innovative in the case of local governance. 
Here local public officials who had been inventing new forms of policy cooperation with one 
another for decades, found their efforts rewarded and reinforced after 3.11.  Prefectures and 
major cities—sometimes in coalition, as in the case of the Kansai Regional Union—were quick to 
identify “counterpart” localities in Tohoku, and charged ahead of the central government to 
determine and meet many of their needs.  For their part, the governors and mayors in the 
affected area could not wait for central government assistance and welcomed the 
demonstration by sibling localities that central guidance was unnecessary in any event.  They 
fashioned ad hoc supply and administrative chains to two substantive ends. First, by dispatching 
thousands of officials across every conceivable policy function for extended tours of duty in the 
affected areas, they assisted Tohoku localities in desperate need. These distant neighbors 
collected, delivered, and distributed emergency supplies; helped plan new civil infrastructure, 
counseled pensioners, relocated refugees, taught children, and collected debris. Second, their 
extended dispatches provided invaluable training for their staff, experience that they reckon will 
be critical when disaster strikes at home. Governors and mayors, and the legions of public 
officials they dispatched, celebrated 2011 as “year one” of solidarity among local 
governments.84  In fact however, they were deepening an important element of local autonomy 
that they had already done much to enhance.  
The third model was deployed by those who believed that 3.11 taught that Japan had 
already come too far in the current direction. This narrative did not compete effectively against 
those arguing for dramatic change or for staying the course in any of these three policy areas.  
In the case of security, this “reverse course” was taken up by advocates of “disarmament.”  Its 
advocates acknowledged the performance of the Japanese soldiers, but argued that the 
successes of the SDF during the rescue and relief effort proved Japanese troops are at their best 
when wielding shovels, not when toting guns.  Disarmament narrators squared off against their 
villains, “militarists” who, they argued, were drawing entirely the wrong lessons from 3.11. 
Rather than see the disaster as an opportunity to make the SDF muscular or to enhance 
jointness in the alliance with the United States, proponents of the third narrative insisted that 
3.11 paved the way for Japan to abandon its ill conceived postwar course toward rearmament 
                                                     
84
 Kamiya, 2011. 
Re-Draft for the Journal of Japanese Studies  7-19-12 
19 
 
and recapture the spirit of its peace constitution. Japan should lead the world by creating a 
global disaster relief force.85  
In energy and local government, this Model Three narrative touched upon many of the 
same themes, and some of its advocates, such as, such as Umehara Takeshi, were the same. 
Theirs was a “back to the future” argument in which Japan should eschew growth and 
rediscover its origins as a society in which urban and rural societies were balanced and in which 
the local vernacular was valued and preserved. Evoking a romanticized pre-Meiji Japan in which 
farmers provided food and city dwellers provided fertilizer in symbiotic balance, and in which 
both lived comfortably with less, advocates of this perspective argued for recycling, 
conservation, and a “simple life.” Some blamed 3.11 on science—particularly western science—
that smugly assumed human beings could control nature.  Business elites pursuing profits by 
deploying dangerous technologies had steered the nation in the wrong direction, and the only 
effective solution would be to dial back notions of scientific progress to manageable levels. 
Western ideas about enlightenment should be surrendered to Buddhist ideas about 
enlightenment—the latter being truer both to Japan and to nature.  
Japan’s post-3.11 discourse was thus a duel among three very different explanations for 
the crisis with three different prescriptions for change. The contest between “putting it gear” 
and “staying the course” was the most robust in each policy area. Still, all three narratives 
captured valuable real estate in the national discourse and, importantly, none was congruent 
with normal “left-right” orientations, what in Japan are typically referred to as conservative 
(hoshu) and progressive (kakushin).  Some of the arguments for active change, as in the case of 
security, were dominated by conservative policy entrepreneurs, but the argument for such 
change in the energy sector was dominated by progressives.  And, of these two arguments in 
the local government case—one was progressive, the other conservative. That most models 
were ideologically catholic undoubtedly made it easier for policy entrepreneurs to engage the 
public and acquire new allies and adherents. The question for analysts of the impact of 3.11, 
then, is the extent to which public opinion and policy shifted as a consequence of all this 
chatter—and in what direction.  
In the case of security, the “proof of concept” seemed to prevail, but even some of its 
own advocates felt the need for Japan to “put it in gear.” Public opinion tilted further than ever 
before toward the legitimacy of the military and the alliance. Still, this new level of support was 
not enough to embolden officials to seek new budgetary allocations or to try to acquire major 
new weapon systems.  Neither did they create major new levers of command and control or 
step up alliance cooperation in ways some wished and that their 3.11 successes might have 
made possible for the first time.  On the contrary, Japanese defense budgets continued to fall, 
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and U.S. exhortations to invoke the nominally available “bilateral coordination mechanism” 
during the first North Korean missile test after 3.11 were rebuffed by Japanese defense 
bureaucrats and alliance managers.  Despite reports of U.S. bullying during the crisis, the 
Japanese public now trusted U.S. and Japanese soldiers more than ever, but decision makers 
remained hesitant to test their new found support.  
In the case of energy, the villainization of the “nuclear village” seemed to dominate the 
national discourse, and every aspect of the extant power system was up for grabs.  But when 
the dust settled, Japan’s nuclear reactors did not remain off line for long, the export of nuclear 
power was reaffirmed as a matter of national policy, and the institutions of the much disputed 
“back end” of the nuclear fuel cycle—the Mutsu fast breeder reactor and the Rokkashō mura 
reprocessing facility—remained largely intact despite dwindling public support.  Although a new 
nuclear regulatory system was established, nuclear power was downsized from earlier plans, 
anti-nuclear activists became members of government advisory bodies, and a feed in tariff was 
implemented to stimulate investment in renewable energy, nuclear power remained a critical 
element of Japan’s fuel mix. So here too it seemed that the “stay the course” narrative 
prevailed—at least in its realist variant.  
Likewise, in the case of local government, while the supersizers and localizers battled it 
out at the center for control of a narrative to “redimension” Japan, neither would prevail—at 
least in the immediate term. The policy entrepreneurs with the greatest success were those 
who locked arms in solidarity against the central government and “stayed the course” to 
enhance translocal solidarity and promote local autonomy.  
 
Conclusion 
Japanese political actors and policy entrepreneurs did what politicians and pundits do 
everywhere after a crisis in a democratic system—they hurried to explain what happened and, 
in the process, they assigned blame and pressed their cases on an engaged public using familiar 
and reassuring tropes. They agreed broadly that a 3.11-like catastrophe must not be allowed to 
recur, but in the process they exaggerated the prospects for change. 
The catastrophe inspired motivational stories of leadership, community, and 
vulnerability that all pointed toward the desirability and, for some, the certainty of change. Civil 
society, building upon its now considerable experience with disaster relief—and using new 
networking technologies—mobilized effectively with the business community and state actors.86  
Yet Japan’s political leadership remained split and its bureaucracy unimaginative; its political 
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parties were weak, its communities more fractured than most would admit. When public 
hearings on Japan’s energy policy choices were finally held in the summer of 2012, they seemed 
to many to be “mere staged formalities,” and were met with derision.87  Yet despite 
unprecedented levels of civic activism and record low levels of trust in public institutions and 
leaders, citizens’ intense sense of vulnerability did not provoke widespread protest of overall 
government dysfunction.  When the balance finally shifted from volunteerism by concerned 
citizens to protests by outraged ones, the largest demonstrations—those held in Tokyo in June 
and July 2012—were focused on the restart of nuclear reactors, and never addressed larger 
concerns with government performance, the simultaneous breakup of the DPJ, the introduction 
of an unpopular consumption tax, or any of the other issues on the national policy agenda. 
In the first two years after the disaster, politicians busied themselves with long standing 
power rivalries that frustrated large scale change. Votes of no confidence were threatened, and 
sometimes held; cabinet ministers came and went as parties teetered for reasons unrelated to 
3.11.  “Normal politics” never gave way to crisis politics. In short, given that so many of the 
narratives were spun up by political entrepreneurs seizing upon new ways to promote long held 
agendas, we ought not be surprised to find that a “stay the course” model prevailed in most 
debate about policy change.  In a sense, a catastrophe that was presented as testing the 
resilience of the Japanese people turned out to demonstrate the resilience of a fairly sclerotic 
political system. 
 On the other hand, 3.11 did stimulate the engagement well informed citizens. For each 
leader who failed the test of agility and flexibility—and even if efforts to “put it in gear” were 
more often frustrated than not—there were policy entrepreneurs who directed innovative ideas 
for change at a newly engaged public. Despite the dysfunctions in Japan’s political class, we 
have seen abundant evidence of creativity in its policy class and renewed activism by citizens. 
Political entrepreneurs from across the political spectrum in think tanks, private firms, and 
universities actively generated policy ideas. Anti-nuclear activists failed to block the restart of 
reactors, but they succeeded with the feed in tariff, mobilized large protests, and came to be 
represented in councils of state. Utilities and their business allies were by no means impotent, 
but they were put on warning that they would no longer enjoy unchallenged positions of 
regional or national leadership. Likewise, the SDF and the alliance with the United States 
emerged from the crisis set to deploy in a military contingency with public support, and the 
Ministry of Defense was better positioned to participate in the making of national security 
policy. Local governments, for their part, were freer of central control than ever before. They 
demonstrated that they could lead the center as often as the center leads them, and their stout, 
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sustained calls for administrative reform were widely acknowledged by the media, the public, 
and the political class. 
So we are left with a paradox. 3.11 has not been the “game changer” many policy 
entrepreneurs desired and predicted. It did not “cause” structural change to the Japanese body 
politic. “Normal” politics prevailed, with all its imperfections, and “staying the course,” rather 
than the more forward leaning “put it in gear,” seemed to prevail across the three policy areas 
we have examined.  Still, the rhetoric of crisis infused democratic politics, empowered new 
actors, stimulated long awaited if piecemeal reforms, aroused considerable public protest, and 
may have pushed the policy process in the direction of transparency.  At a minimum, the 
catastrophe opened all of these possibilities and, in a famously conservative system, the first 
months that followed the quake, the tsunami, and the meltdown provided encouraging (if 
limited) signs of change for those who hoped for a new style in Japanese politics.  Would those 
early moves result in long-term alterations in the country’s politics?  It is too early to tell and 
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